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Notes
ACLU v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD- READING PICO
IMPRECISELY, WRITING UNDUE RESTRICTIONS ON PUBLIC
SCHOOL LIBRARY BOOKS, AND ADDING TO THE COLLECTION
OF STUDENTS' FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT VIOLATIONS
"What a school thinks about its library is a measure of what it feels
about education."-Harold Howe III
I. INTRODUCTION
As a corollary to the insight articulated by Harold Howe II, the former
Commissioner of Education, callous restrictions on school library collec-
tions jeopardize schools' educational value and impede students' learn-
ing.2 The ideals libraries promote-intellectual growth and the exchange
of ideas-are essential aspects of a well-functioning society.3 Thus, there
is a great risk that society's progress will be deterred when the government
inhibits access to library materials.4 It is particularly harmful and repug-
nant to the First Amendment when the government restricts access to
ideas to intentionally suppress their message.5
In the public school setting, libraries enable students to access ideas
unavailable in the school curriculum and provide a means for students to
1. On Libraries and Learning, 13 SCH. LIBR. J. 27, 28 (1967), reprinted in 92 LIBR.
J. 842 (1967) (describing significance of public school library in public education
system).
2. See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 868-69 (1982) (plurality opinion)
(discussing harmful impact of restrictions in public school libraries).
3. See Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99,
100 (1996) (explaining that exchange of wide variety of ideas enhances society).
See generally AM. LIBRARY Ass'N, Intellectual Freedom and Censorship Q & A, http://
www.ala.org/ala/aboutala/offices/oif/basics/ifcensorshipqanda.cfm (last visited
Apr. 7, 2011) (discussing importance of intellectual freedom for society).
4. See Martin D. Munic, Comment, Education or Indoctrination-Removal of
Books from Public School Libraries: Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free
School District No. 26 v. Pico, 68 MINN. L. REv. 213, 237 (1983) (proposing that
state action mandating removal of library books is harmful because it denies access
to constitutionally protected information and thus government must have compel-
ling interest for taking such action); see also ANNE PROFFIrrr DUPRE, SPEAKING UP:
THE UNINTENDED COSTS OF FREE SPEECH IN PUBLIC SCHOOLs 108 (2009) (explain-
ing harm caused by government censorship).
5. See DUPRE, supra note 4, at 129 (arguing that deliberate restrictions on ideas
by government violates constitutional guarantees). As governmental actors, public
libraries must act in accordance with the First Amendment. See Anne Klinefelter,
First Amendment Limits on Library Collection Management, 102 LAw LIBR. J. 343, 349
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independently expand their knowledge outside of the classroom.6 To sup-
port students' education, it is crucial that those with authority to restrict
access to public school library materials do so in accordance with the First
Amendment.7 Yet, the appropriate breadth of First Amendment protec-
tions in public schools is enigmatic. 8 In scholastic settings, exposure to a
wide variety of views is crucial for intellectual development, but public
schools also serve as forums in which the government has a significant role
in preparing students for participation in society.9 The tension between
intellectual freedom and the government's academic agenda is especially
problematic in public school libraries, where school officials can exercise
discretion to restrict the range of permissible materials.' 0
This tension fueled the controversy in a recent case from the Eleventh
Circuit, American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County
School Board." I The Eleventh Circuit addressed a dispute that arose when a
school board ordered the removal of a book from a public school library
that the board alleged was factually inaccurate.' 2 When deciding to re-
move the book, however, school board members expressed personal dis-
dain for the book's subject matter.1 3 The district court determined that
the school board removed the book to prevent access to ideas the book
contained-a violation of the First Amendment as articulated by the Su-
preme Court in Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No.
6. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 868-69 (discussing value of public school libraries); see
also Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1275 (D. N.H. 1979) ("The
student who discovers the magic of the library is on the way to a life-long experi-
ence of self-education and enrichment . ... [and] leams that a library is a place to
test or expand upon ideas presented to him, in or out of the classroom."); Richard
J. Peltz, Pieces of Pico: Saving Intellectual Freedom in the Public School Library, 2005 BYU
EDUC. & L.J. 103, 107 (describing important role of public school libraries in pro-
viding students with freedom to access resources unavailable in classroom).
7. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 869 (requiring acknowledgment of students' First
Amendment rights in public school libraries).
8. See Heins, supra note 3, at 158-59 (explaining that nature of public schools
makes it difficult to determine how First Amendment should apply in schools); see
also DUPRE, supra note 4, at 110 (characterizing extent of certain First Amendment
rights in schools as "bewildering"). See generally NAT'L COAL. AGAINST CENSORSHIP,
The First Amendment in Schools: An Introduction, http://www.ncac.org/education/
schools/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 7, 2011) (discussing relationship between First
Amendment and schools). For a further discussion on the role of the First Amend-
ment in public schools, see infra note 28.
9. See Heins, supra note 3, at 158-59 (describing competing values within pub-
lic school system). See generally KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROM
THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2003) (summarizing role of First Amendment in public
schools).
10. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 863-64 (discussing school officials' authority to use
discretion in managing school affairs).
11. 557 F.3d 1177 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied 130 S. Ct. 659.
12. See Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d at 1182-90 (providing details of dispute).
13. See id. at 1184-87 (explaining circumstances of deliberations).
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26 v. Pico.14 The Eleventh Circuit reversed, determining instead that the
board removed the book because it was not educationally suitable and,
therefore, acted permissibly under Pico.'5
This Note argues that the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Miami-Dade
unduly impeded students' First Amendment rights.16 The court's inter-
pretation of Pico demonstrates that assessing a public school library book
removal decision based solely on the book's educational suitability is insuf-
ficient because that analysis overlooks the potential that improper factors
motivated the removal decision.' 7 To more adequately protect students'
First Amendment rights, this Note advocates interpreting Pico to prohibit a
book removal upon a showing that improper factors influenced the re-
moval decision.' 8 Establishing that improper factors influenced the deci-
sion refutes the possibility that the sole factor motivating the decision was
the book's educational suitability.' 9
Part II of this Note discusses libraries' role in public schools and pro-
vides an overview of court decisions concerning public school library book
removals. 20 Part III examines the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in Miami-
Dade.2' Part IV argues that the Eleventh Circuit erroneously endorsed a
First Amendment violation by concluding that the Miami-Dade school
board's removal decision was valid under Pico.2 2 Part V discusses the im-
plications of the Eleventh Circuit's decision and argues that future courts
should interpret Pico differently to more adequately protect students' First
Amendment rights.2 3
14. See 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion); Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d at 1189-
90 (discussing district court's findings under Pico).
15. See Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d at 1222-27 (reversing district court's decision on
First Amendment issue).
16. For a discussion of why the Eleventh Circuit's decision is unwarranted and
how it may have grave implications for the future, see infra notes 151-207 and
accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of why assessing only the educational suitability of a chal-
lenged book is insufficient, see infra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the importance of prohibiting an improperly moti-
vated book removal decision, see infra notes 192-207 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of how pretextual motivations motivating book removal
decisions violate the First Amendment, see infra notes 184-207 and accompanying
text.
20. For a discussion of public school libraries' role in public schools and case
law pertaining to public school library book removals, see infra notes 24-108 and
accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the facts and procedural posture of Miami-Dade as well
as the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning, see infra notes 109-50 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of why the Eleventh Circuit's decision is flawed, see infra
notes 151-83 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the impact of the Eleventh Circuit's decision, see infra
notes 184-207 and accompanying text.
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II. THE "UNIQUE ROLE OF THE SCHOOL LiBRARY" 2 4
A. The Story of Public School Libraries
Advancement in American society largely depends upon contribu-
tions made by informed citizens. 25 To foster a well-informed citizenry, the
government endeavors to instill in students values that promote effective
participation in society through the public school system.2 6 To accom-
plish this goal, local school boards have the authority to make discretion-
ary decisions involving the public education system.27 Yet, such discretion
must not be exercised in a manner that unduly impedes First Amendment
freedoms. 28
24. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 869 (1982) (plurality opinion)
(classifying school libraries as unique).
25. See id. at 876 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment) (explaining that "[the] Constitution presupposes the existence of an in-
formed citizenry prepared to participate").
26. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 278 (1988) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) ("Public education serves vital national interests in preparing
the Nation's youth for life in our increasingly complex society and for the duties of
citizenship in our democratic Republic."); see also SAUNDERS, supra note 9, at 86
(explaining that society has responsibility to ensure that children will mature into
"responsible adults, capable of functioning in society").
27. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 894 (Powell, J., dissenting) (describing role of school
boards in public education system); see also STEPHEN B. THOMAS ET AL., PUBLIC
SCHOOL LAw: TEACHERS' AND STUDENTS' RIGHTS 4-6 (6th ed. 2009) (describing role
of local school boards); Munic, supra note 4, at 224 (explaining that through local
school boards, communities "transmit societal values to students via public educa-
tion"). Commentators explain that students in primary and secondary schools "are
not fully mature intellectually or emotionally." See DUPRE, supra note 4, at 132;
SAUNDERS, supra note 9, at 86-90 (providing that children are not as developmen-
tally advanced as adults). As such, educators and school officials endeavor to trans-
mit social values and information to young students in a manner that is particularly
sensitive to students' maturity levels. See DUPRE, supra note 4, at 132 (noting that
schools must carefully present material to students); SAUNDERS supra note 9, at 95-
103 (justifying society's responsibility to transmit values and information to
students).
28. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 863-64 (plurality opinion) (explaining that school
boards may use discretion to manage education system but must nevertheless com-
port with First Amendment). The First Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The Supreme Court instructs that "students
do not 'shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate."' Pico, 457 U.S. at 865 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)) (affirming that students have First
Amendment rights). Nevertheless, students' First Amendment rights are not
boundless and must be "'applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment.'" Id. at 866 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506). Yet, the Supreme
Court also mandates that schools "may not be run in such a manner as to 'pre-
scribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion.'" Id. at 876 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943))
(expressing that there are limits to educators' inculcative function); see also
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 285-86 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he state educator's
undeniable, and undeniably vital, mandate to inculcate moral and political values
100 [Vol. 56: p. 97
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Public libraries are valuable resources through which the government
strives to provide citizens the opportunity to expand their knowledge.2 9
Libraries benefit society by supporting free scholarship and public dis-
course.3 0 Public officials can diminish libraries' value when they remove
materials from library shelves, because removal effectively restricts access
to ideas. 3' When officials intentionally remove books with which they disa-
gree, such action constitutes an imposition of authorities' personal ideolo-
gies upon the citizenry and violates constitutional guarantees.3 2
In the public school context, the extent of educators' authority to
restrict library materials is a particularly contentious issue.33 Libraries
have a unique role in the public school system because they operate within
the school environment but outside of the classroom. 34 This context pro-
is not a general warrant to act as 'thought police' stifling discussion of all but state-
approved topics and advocacy of all but the official position.").
29. See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 203 (2003) ("Public
libraries pursue the worthy missions of facilitating learning and cultural enrich-
ment."); Kelly Sarabyn, Prescribing Orthodoxy, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L. POLY & ETHICS J.
367, 388 (2010) (explaining role of public libraries in society).
30. See Sarabyn, supra note 29, at 388 (discussing benefits of public libraries).
31. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 868-69 (providing that removing books from libraries
creates risk of impeding access to ideas); Sarabyn, supra note 29, at 388 (arguing
that restricting library materials disrupts acquisition of knowledge); Kristin Hus-
ton, Note, "Silent Censorship": The School Library and the Insidious Book Selection Censor,
72 UMKC L. REv. 241, 241 (2003) (discussing detrimental effects of restricting
materials in libraries). Individuals often contest certain books' inclusion in library
collections. See AM. LIBRARY Ass'N, About Banned &f Challenged Books, http://www.
ala.org/ala/issuesadvocacy/banned/aboutbannedbooks/index.cfm (last visited
Apr. 7, 2011) (explaining contests to library collections). A book "challenge" oc-
curs when one makes an "attempt to remove or restrict materials, based upon the
objections of a person or group." Id. When challenged materials are removed
from a library, a book "banning" occurs. See id. When materials are removed from
libraries, there is a risk that citizens' opportunities to access to ideas will decrease.
See Pico, 457 U.S. at 868-69 (expressing that removing books from libraries reduces
opportunities for voluntary educational inquiry).
32. See Pico, 457 at 871 ("Our Constitution does not permit the official sup-
pression of ideas."); Sarabyn, supra note 29, at 388 (discussing unconstitutionality
of removing books from libraries to deny access to ideas).
33. See, e.g., Pico, 457 U.S. at 868-69 (addressing issue of public school library
book removals); Am. Civil Liberties Union of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Sch.
Bd., 557 F.3d 1177, 1202 (11th Cir. 2009) (assessing removal of public school li-
brary book), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 659; Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd.,
64 F.3d 184, 187-91 (5th Cir. 1995) (same); Counts v. Cedarville Sch. Dist., 295 F.
Supp. 2d 996, 999 (W.D. Ark. 2003) (addressing restrictions on public school li-
brary collection); Case v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 908 F. Supp. 864, 874-75 (D.
Kan. 1995) (evaluating propriety of removing public school library book), affd in
part, rev'd on other grounds in part, 157 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Huston,
supra note 31, at 244 (discussing problematic issue of controlling school library
materials).
34. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 869 ("[U]se of ... school libraries is completely volun-
tary on the part of students. ... [S]election of books from these libraries is en-
tirely a matter of free choice; the libraries afford them an opportunity at self-
education and individual enrichment that is wholly optional."); see alsoJoelle C.
Achtman, Note, Pico Takes a Visit to Cuba: Will Pretext Become Precedent in the Eleventh
2011] NOTE 101
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vokes tension between the competing educational ideals of instilling com-
munity values and students' intellectual freedom.3 5
Whether the school library is subject to the same controls school offi-
cials have over the curriculum is currently a matter of debate.3 6 Classify-
ing public school libraries as curricular suggests that authorities may
exercise broad discretion to restrict students' access to library materials. 3 7
Conversely, the Supreme Court endorsed the opposing view in Pico, pro-
viding that the school library operates separately from the curriculum. 3 8
Under this view, a school library is not subject to the same constraints that
educators may exert over the classroom.3 9
Circuit?, 63 U. MiAMi L. REv. 943, 948 (2009) (characterizing public school libraries
as "separate sphere with respect to the scope of curricular and educational
influence").
35. See THOMAS, supra note 27, at 85 (explaining that there is tension between
competing values of students' acquisition of knowledge and "instilling basic com-
munity values" in public school libraries); see also Elizabeth M. Gamsky, Note, Judi-
cial Clairvoyance and the First Amendment: The Role of Motivation in judicial Review of
Book Banning in the Public Schools, 1983 U. ILL. L. REv. 731, 731 (1983) ("Few tradi-
tions are as well-entrenched in American society as local control over public educa-
tion. . . . [F]ew notions are as anti-democratic as library censorship." (footnote
omitted)); Munic, supra note 4, at 217 (discussing tension between inculcation and
students' free inquiry).
36. See Achtman, supra note 34, at 948 (noting uncertainty as to whether
school libraries are curricular). Compare Pico, 457 U.S. at 869 (classifying public
school library as distinct from school curriculum), and Roberts v. Madigan, 702 F.
Supp. 1505, 1513 (D. Colo. 1989) ("[Tlhe school library must be distinguished
from the classroom library."), affd, 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990), with Pico, 457
U.S. at 915 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting) ("[School libraries] serve as supplements to
[schools'] inculcative role. . . . [E]lementary and secondary school libraries are
not designed for freewheeling inquiry; they are tailored, as the public school cur-
riculum is tailored, to the teaching of basic skills and ideas."), andJane L. Wexton,
Comment, Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v.
Pico, 12 HOFSTRA L. Rev. 561, 589-90 (1984) (arguing that distinguishing school
library from school curriculum is misguided).
37. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 915 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that school
library does not operate separately from curriculum and that educators can per-
missibly control library materials); see also Virgil v. Sch. Bd., 862 F.2d 1517, 1520
(11th Cir. 1989) ("In matters pertaining to the curriculum, educators have been
accorded greater control over expression than they may enjoy in other spheres of
activity."); Peitz, supra note 6, at 107-08 (arguing that distinguishing school library
from curriculum is vital to prevent restrictions from interfering with students'
learning opportunities).
38. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 869 (plurality opinion) (maintaining that school li-
brary is distinct from school curriculum).
39. See id. (establishing that educators' role in school library differs from au-
thority over school curriculum).
102 [Vol. 56: p. 97
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B. Supreme Court Guidance on a "Novel" Issue
1. Board of Education v. Pico: The "First Edition" of Students' Rights in
the Public School Library
Pico, decided in 1982, is the sole Supreme Court decision to date in-
volving the removal of books from public school libraries.4 0 In 1975,
members of the Board of Education of the Island Trees Union Free
School District No. 26 acquired a list of nine books deemed unsuitable by
a politically conservative organization and directed the removal of the
books from the school libraries.4 1 The school board "characterized the
removed books as 'anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-[Semitic], and just
plain filthy,' and concluded that '[it] is our duty, our moral obligation, to
protect the children in our schools from this moral danger."' 42 Although
a book review committee evaluating the books' educational value advised
retaining several of the books, the school board hastily rejected the recom-
mendation.4 3 In response, students brought suit, alleging that the school
board's actions violated their First Amendment rights.4 4 The district court
granted summary judgment in the school board's favor, finding that the
40. See THOMAS, supra note 27, at 84 (noting that Pico is only Supreme Court
decision involving public school library materials). In the decades preceding Pico,
courts faced an increased volume of public school library book removal cases. See
Huston, supra note 31, at 245 (explaining history of litigation over school library
book challenges). The rise in litigation may be attributable to the trend of includ-
ing more mature themes in children's literature during the twentieth century. See
id. at 243-44 (offering reason for increase in book removal court cases). When
assessing the validity of the book removals in these decisions, courts often consid-
ered the motivating factors behind removal decision to be highly significant. See,
e.g., Minarcini v. Strongsville City Sch. Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582-83 (6th Cir. 1976)
(finding First Amendment violation when school officials removed book from
school library because they disagreed with book's content); Sheck v. Baileyville
Sch. Comm., 530 F. Supp. 679, 681, 692-93 (D. Me. 1982) (granting injunction
against removal of school library book deemed objectionable by school board that
did not read book); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1272, 1275
(D. N.H. 1979) (finding that school board's removal of magazine from school li-
brary because of political and sexual content was unconstitutional); Right to Read
Def. Comm. of Chelsea v. Sch. Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 712, 715 (D. Mass. 1978)
(enjoining removal of school library book with sexual content upon finding that
alleged motive for removal was pretextual). But see Bicknell v. Vergennes Union
High Sch. Bd. of Dirs., 638 F.2d 438, 440-41 (2d Cir. 1980) (upholding removal of
indecent and vulgar school library book); Zykan v. Warsaw Cmty. Sch. Corp., 631
F.2d 1300, 1308 (7th Cir. 1980) (concluding that allegations that school removed
book from school library for unconstitutional reasons did not adequately demon-
strate violation); Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d
289, 291, 294 (2d Cir. 1972) (allowing removal of violent and sexual school library
book).
41. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 856-58 (describing circumstances leading to board's
removal decision).
42. Id. at 857 (quoting Pico v. Bd. of Ed., 474 F. Supp. 387, 390 (E.D.N.Y.
1979)) (explaining board's alleged reasoning for direction to remove books).
43. See id. at 858 (noting that board did not follow book review committee's
advice).
44. See id. at 858-59 (providing plaintiffs' allegations).
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removal did not unduly infringe upon students' rights. 4 5 The Second Cir-
cuit disagreed and reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 46
Writing for the Supreme Court plurality, Justice Brennan acknowl-
edged that school boards have wide discretion when promoting the educa-
tional purpose of schools, but stressed that this authority is limited and
must not intrude upon First Amendment guarantees. 4 7 Thus, judicial in-
tervention is necessary when school authorities unduly interfere with con-
stitutional rights available to students. 4 8 Maintaining that constraints
upon access to ideas offend the First Amendment, the Court proclaimed
that "the First Amendment rights of students may be directly and sharply
implicated by the removal of books from the shelves of a school library."4 9
In contrast to the mandatory classroom context, school libraries provide
students the opportunity to voluntarily access ideas and, therefore, merit
special First Amendment protection. 5
The Court determined a school board violates First Amendment
rights where a "substantial factor" in the board's decision to remove a
book from school library shelves was to intentionally restrict access to ideas
with which they disagreed; restricting access in this manner would amount
to an unjust imposition of officials' ideological views." Yet, a removal
45. See id. at 859-60 (noting that district court determined that school board
had "broad discretion to formulate educational policy" and that court should not
intervene in absence of constitutional violation).
46. See id. at 860-61 (describing procedural posture of case).
47. See id. at 863-66 (providing that school board's discretion is not unlim-
ited). The Court affirmed that students have the rights of freedom of speech and
expression guaranteed under the Constitution. See id. at 865 (maintaining that
students have First Amendment rights). As a result, "local school boards must dis-
charge their [discretion] within the limits and constraints of the First Amend-
ment." Id. (noting that school boards must remain cognizant of constitutional
guarantees). When addressing the constitutional issue, Justice Brennan empha-
sized that the case did not concern the school curriculum, but only the public
school library. See id. at 862 (clarifying that decision applies to school libraries and
not school curricula).
48. See id. at 866 (expressing that courts should intervene in school affairs
when school authorities violate constitutionally protected rights).
49. Id. at 866-68 (explaining that "the right to receive ideas is a necessary
predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press,
and political freedom" and that "the special characteristics of the school library
make that environment especially appropriate for the recognition of the First
Amendment rights of students"). Although whether the government has an af-
firmative obligation to provide information in public libraries is contested, once
the government makes information available in a public library, "removal of that
material must meet First Amendment doctrinal tests because that removal could
constitute abridgement" of First Amendment guarantees. See Klinefelter, supra
note 5, at 350-51 (explaining how removal of library materials implicates First
Amendment).
50. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 869 (distinguishing "regime of voluntary inquiry" in
school library from "compulsory environment" of school classroom).
51. See id. at 871, 871 n.22 (deciding that First Amendment violation would
occur if school board removed book from library to prevent others from accessing
ideas with which board members disagreed).
[Vol. 56: p. 97104
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would be permissible if the book was "pervasively vulgar" or if the "removal
decision was based solely upon the 'educational suitability"' of the book.52
As a result, the Court held that "local school boards may not remove books
from school library shelves simply because they dislike the ideas contained
in those books and seek by their removal to 'prescribe what shall be ortho-
dox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion."' 5 3 In
light of the board's disregard of proper book removal procedures and of
recommendations to retain the books, the Court concluded that there was
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the board removed the
books for constitutionally valid reasons and affirmed the Second Circuit's
decision. 54
Pico did not produce a binding majority opinion: three Justices joined
the plurality, two Justices concurred, and four Justices dissented.5 5 The
52. Id. at 871 (emphasis added) (explaining that constitutional violation
would not occur if school board removed book because it was vulgar or solely
because it was not educationally suitable).
53. Id. at 872 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943)) (holding that school boards cannot remove books from public school li-
brary shelves out of disagreement with ideas in books or to suppress access to ideas
contained in books).
54. See id. at 874-75 (affirming appellate court's decision because genuine is-
sue of material fact existed as to whether school board removed books for valid
reasons). The Court clarified that its decision would be different "if the record
demonstrated that petitioners had employed established, regular, and facially un-
biased procedures for the review of controversial materials. . . . [But] petitioners'
removal procedures were highly irregular and ad hoc-the antithesis of those pro-
cedures that might tend to allay suspicions regarding petitioners' motivations." Id.
(justifying conclusion that board's decision could have been improperly moti-
vated). Ater the Supreme Court's decision, the need for additional litigation sub-
sided because the parties reached a private settlement outside of court under
which the school board returned the books to the school library. See Peltz, supra
note 6, at 130-31 (explaining that parties settled outside of court).
55. See Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (providing plurality, concurring, and dissenting
opinions). Justice Blackmun, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment,
essentially agreed with the plurality, but reasoned that the First Amendment con-
cern at issue was less so the restriction on the right to receive information, but
rather the state officials' attempt to deny students' access to ideas with which they
disagreed. See id. at 875-82 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (stressing that First Amendment violation occurs when officials restrict
access to ideas of which they disapprove). Justice White, concurring in the judg-
ment, did not contest the plurality's reasoning, but asserted that as a procedural
matter it was appropriate to remand the case to further develop the facts underly-
ing the motivation for the book removal decision. See id. at 883-84 (White, J., con-
curring in judgment) (expressing that "unresolved factual issue" required further
findings).
In dissent, ChiefJustice Burger's opinion maintained that the plurality wrong-
fully constructed a First Amendment right to receive information and that the plu-
rality's decision would lead to court intervention into educational policy decisions
that rather should be made by individuals more aware of students' needs, such as
school administrators. See id. at 885-93 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (disagreeing pri-
marily with plurality's allowance of excessive court intervention). Also questioning
the plurality's analysis of the First Amendment right to receive information,Justice
Powell dissented and stressed that the plurality's decision destabilized school
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Court did, however, reach a consensus that a decision to remove a book to
deny access to its ideas would be unconstitutional.5 6 Nevertheless, as a
plurality decision, Pico is not binding precedent, but still maintains signifi-
cant influence as persuasive authority.5 7 This has caused uncertainty as to
boards' traditional responsibility to make educational decisions. See id. at 893-97
(Powell, J., dissenting). In another dissent, Justice Rehnquist challenged the plu-
rality's analysis of students' rights to receive information and asserted that the
school board acted within its authority because the books at issue were not appro-
priate for students. See id. at 904-20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Finally, Justice
O'Connor dissented, advocating that the school board properly decided to remove
the books in accordance with its special responsibility over educational concerns.
See id. at 921 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (condoning school board's actions).
56. See Heins, supra note 3, at 162 (arguing that majority of Pico justices
agreed that action by state officials that denies access to ideas with which they
disagree is constitutionally impermissible). The plurality opinion clearly asserted
that such action violates constitutional guarantees. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 872 (plural-
ity opinion) (providing that removing books to deliberately deny access to ideas is
unconstitutional). Justice Blackmun's concurrence expresses the same sentiment.
See id. at 879 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
("[Olur precedents command the conclusion that the State may not act to deny
access to an idea simply because state officials disapprove of that idea for partisan
or political reasons."). Moreover, Justice White's concurring opinion does not re-
ject this principle. See id. at 883-84 (White,J., concurring in judgment) (refraining
from disagreeing with plurality's assessment). Even three out of the four dissent-
ers embraced this notion, forJustice Rehnquist, joined by ChiefJustice Burger and
Justice Powell, purported that on the notion that official suppression of ideas is not
constitutional, "I can cheerfully concede . . . ." Id. at 907 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) (recognizing that Constitution does not condone suppression of ideas by
officials).
57. See DuPRE, supra note 4, at 121-22 (explaining that Pico is not binding be-
cause it is plurality decision). Essentially, a plurality opinion "lack[s] enough
judges' votes to constitute a majority, but receiv[es] more votes than any other
opinion." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1125 (8th ed. 2004). As a result, plurality deci-
sions do not necessarily carry the same precedential weight as majority decisions.
See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (differentiating application of
plurality opinions from that of majority opinions). The Supreme Court articulated
an approach for courts to adopt when applying a plurality opinion, stating that
"[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds."' Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)
(plurality opinion)) (directing how to apply plurality decisions). This rule aims to
provide predictable applications of the law by lower courts. See Linda Novak, Note,
The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 756, 763
(1980) (explaining Supreme Court's objective in Marks). Yet, the Supreme Court
also acknowledged that in some cases, "[t]his test is more easily stated than ap-
plied" and that when attempting to apply the standard, lower courts are often left
"baffled and divided." Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745-46 (1994)
(describing disadvantages of Marks approach). Lower courts maintain considera-
ble discretion when applying plurality decisions, and often struggle to determine
which concurring opinion in a plurality decision should apply. See Linas E.
Ledebur, Comment, Plurality Rule: Concurring Opinions and a Divided Supreme Court,
113 PENN ST. L. REv. 899, 905 (2009) (describing problems associated with plural-
ity decisions). In spite of the confusion that surrounds the application of such
cases, Supreme Court plurality decisions remain available to courts as valuable per-
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whether lower courts should apply Pico in public school library book re-
moval cases.5 8 Although the Pico plurality is commonly applied in these
cases, whether to apply another standard instead is currently contested.5 9
2. The Court Authors a Potential Alternative to Pico: Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier6 0
The uncertainty surrounding Pico's applicability to public school li-
brary book removal cases escalated when the Supreme Court decided Ha-
zelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.61 In 1983, a high school principal
objected to the content of two student-authored articles for publication in
the school-sponsored newspaper involving teenage pregnancy and di-
vorce.6 2 Believing that there would not be enough time to edit the articles
before the scheduled publication date, the principal omitted the articles
out of concern that the subject matter would be inappropriate for stu-
dents.6 3 The Court found that the principal validly censored the mature
content; distinguishing the category of school-sponsored, expressive activi-
ties, the Court held that educators can exercise editorial control over stu-
dent speech when the measures taken are "reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns."64
In reaching its decision, the Court emphasized that preserving educa-
tors' editorial authority over curricular activities is essential to maintain
schools' integrity.6 5 The Court reasoned that it is crucial for schools to
suasive authority. See Marks, 430 U.S. at 193 (explaining precedential value of plu-
rality opinions).
58. See Am. Civil Liberties Union of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd.,
557 F.3d 1177, 1202 (11th Cir. 2009) (questioning Pico's precedential value), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 659. For further discussion of how lower courts have applied Pico,
see infra notes 77-150 and accompanying text.
59. See Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d at 1202 (contemplating propriety of applying
Pico).
60. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
61. See Alan Brownstein, The Nonforum as a First Amendment Category: Bringing
Order Out of the Chaos of Free Speech Cases Involving School-Sponsored Activities, 42 U.C.
DAvis L. REv. 717, 755 (2009) (questioning whether Kuhlmeier's legitimate peda-
gogical concern standard supersedes Pico); Brittany Love, Comment, Today's Incon-
sistencies, Tomorrow's Problems: An in Depth Consideration of the Challenges Facing School
Administrators in Regulating Student Speech, 35 S.U. L. REv. 611, 618 (2008) (arguing
that Kuhlmeier "has left questions concerning the validity of the Court's decision in
Pico").
62. See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 263 (discussing facts of case).
63. See id. at 263-64 (providing facts of case).
64. Id. at 273 (holding that educators can exercise editorial control over cur-
ricular matters because of educational concerns). The Court reasoned, "It is only
when the decision to censor a . .. vehicle of student expression has no valid educa-
tional purpose that the First Amendment is so 'directly and sharply implicate [ed]'
as to require judicial intervention to protect students' constitutional rights." Id.
(quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)) (clarifying scope of stu-
dents' protection against censorship).
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maintain curricula that are educationally suitable for students. 6 6 Also,
schools have a responsibility to protect students from exposure to mature
content.6 7 Moreover, schools should not be held responsible for student
viewpoints that are not morally or politically neutral.6 8 In effect, Kuhlmeier
provides educators with authority to censor, but the reach of this power is
limited to curricular matters and must be justified by legitimate educa-
tional concerns. 69
Presently, it is unclear whether Kuhlmeier should apply in public
school library book removal cases. 70 Because Pico's precedential value is
not binding, Kuhlmeier may be applied instead.7' Yet, doing so might
prove problematic, as classifying public school libraries as curricular is
contested.7 2 Because of this uncertainty, courts have not definitively de-
termined the governing standard.73
C. Lower Court Additions to the "Collection" of Public School
Library Book Removal Cases
Although challenges to the removal of public school library books are
frequent, most are not publicized and only a handful have been addressed
66. See id. (stressing importance of educationally suitable curriculum). The
Court directed that a school need not endorse "speech that is ... ungrammatical,
poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane,
or unsuitable for immature audiences. A school must be able to set high standards
for the student speech that is disseminated under its auspices." Id. at 271-72 (foot-
note omitted).
67. See id. at 272 (providing reasoning for holding).
68. See id. (justifying decision).
69. See id. at 272-73 (describing holding).
70. See Am. Civil Liberties Union of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cty. Sch. Bd., 557
F.3d 1177, 1202 (11th Cir. 2009) (considering applying Kuhlmeier in case concern-
ing public school library book removal), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 659; Brownstein,
supra note 61, at 724 (noting uncertainty in applying Kuhimeier standard to student
free speech claims); Love, supra note 61, at 618 (questioning whether Kuhlmeier
should apply in place of Pico).
71. See Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d at 1202 (postulating that Kuhlmeier could apply in
place of Pico because Pico's value as precedent is not definite).
72. See Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 64 F.3d 184, 189, 189 n.29
(5th Cir. 1995) (differentiating school library from curriculum and implying that
Kuhlmeier does not apply in school library context); Case v. Unified Sch. Dist. No.
233, 895 F. Supp. 1463, 1469 (D. Kan. 1995) (maintaining that Kuhimeier pertains
only to school curriculum and should not apply in public school library book re-
moval cases), affd in part, rev'd on other grounds in part, 157 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir.
1998). For a further discussion of the propriety of classifying public school librar-
ies as curricular, see supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
73. See Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d at 1202 (noting that it is unsettled whether
Kuhlmeier or Pico is correct standard to apply); Brownstein, supra note 61, at 724
("[C]ourts struggle to determine when [Kuhlmeieis] legitimate pedagogical con-
cern standard should be applied in reviewing student free speech claims."); see also
Roberts v. Madigan, 702 F. Supp. 1505, 1513 (D. Colo. 1989) (asserting that school
library and classroom are distinguishable and that "[t] his distinction mandates dif-
ferent constitutional results"), affd, 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990).
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in court since the Supreme Court decided Pico.7 4 In light of the confusion
surrounding how to address school library book challenges, each decision
provides valuable guidance for future courts confronting the issue.7 5 Sig-
nificantly, every court addressing this issue has elected to apply Pico-not-
withstanding its status as a plurality decision.7 6
After Kuhlmeier and Pico, the issue of public school library book re-
moval was next addressed in a Fifth Circuit decision, Campbell v. St. Tam-
many Parish School Board.77 In 1992, the St. Tammany Parish School Board
removed a book about African religions entitled Voodoo and Hoodoo from
its schools' libraries.7 8 After a parent challenged the book's inclusion in
her child's school library, a school review committee determined that the
book was educationally suitable but recommended requiring parental per-
mission to access the book and placing it on a reserve shelf.79 The board
subsequently voted to remove the book from school library shelves, but
did not provide any justification for its decision.80 In response, students'
parents filed a lawsuit alleging that the removal violated the students' First
Amendment rights, and the district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs.8 ' The district court reasoned that the board ob-
jected to the book's content and deliberately denied students' access to its
ideas.82
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged Pico's recognition that
public school libraries are distinct from public school curricula and thus
are afforded greater constitutional protections.8 3 The Campbell court de-
termined that Pico was the appropriate standard to apply in public school
74. See DuPRE, supra note 4, at 136 ("Challenges to books in school libraries
have continued unabated since the Pico case."); Achtman, supra note 34, at 963-68
(summarizing lower court decisions that have applied Pico); Robert P. Doyle, Think
For Yourself and Let Others Do the Same: Books Challenged or Banned in 2009-2010, at 2
(2010), http://www.ala.org/ala/issuesadvocacy/banned/bannedbooksweek/ideas
andresources/free downloads/2010banned.pdf (explaining that most library
book challenges are not reported).
75. See Achtman, supra note 34, at 958 (explaining that cases concerning pub-
lic school library book removals exemplify how other courts should approach
issue).
76. See id. at 963 (providing that lower courts that have addressed public
school library book removals applied Pico). For a further discussion of lower court
cases concerning pubic school library book removals, see infra notes 77-105 and
accompanying text.
77. 64 F.3d 184 (5th Cir. 1995).
78. See id. at 185 (providing circumstances leading to dispute).
79. See id. at 185-86 (describing facts of case). A second review committee
also advised retaining the book. See id. at 186 (explaining appeal of committee's
determination).
80. See id. at 187 (describing school board's actions).
81. See id. (providing procedural posture of case).
82. See id. (discussing district court's holding).
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library book removal cases. 8 4 Because Pico is a plurality decision, the court
elected to apply Pico's narrowest concurring opinion; thus, the court
agreed with the plurality that a removal decision would be unconstitu-
tional if the decisive factor behind the decision was the school officials'
intent to deny access to ideas with which they disagreed.8 5 The court
noted that because many school board members did not read the book
and disregarded the review committee's recommendations, the members
might have had improper motives when they decided to remove the
book.8 6 Yet, the court determined that there was insufficient evidence to
grant summary judgment, and remanded the case to further develop the
record.87
A public school library book removal again raised controversy in Case
v. Unified School District No. 233.88 In 1993, the donation of a book with a
homosexual story line, entitled Annie on My Mind, to the Olathe School
District's libraries provoked media attention and public outrage.8 9 The
controversy prompted a review of the book's suitability after which educa-
tors determined that the novel was appropriate to include in the library
collections.9 o Unsatisfied by the decision, the superintendent indepen-
dently prepared a set of guidelines concerning book donations, declared
that Annie on My Mind did not satisfy the requirements, and mandated the
book's removal from the school libraries.9 ' The school board upheld the
removal, emphasizing that the book's glorification of homosexuality ren-
dered the book educationally unsound.9 2 In response, students brought
suit against the school district, alleging violations of their First Amend-
ment rights.9 3
84. See id. at 187-89 (deciding to apply Pico).
85. See id. at 188-89 (applying narrowest concurring opinion in Pico).
86. See id. at 190 (explaining likelihood of improper motivation behind book
removal).
87. See id. at 191 (remanding case). After the court remanded the case, the
parties reached a settlement, thus eliminating the need for further proceedings.
See Notable First American Court Cases, AM. LIBRARY Ass'N, http://www.ala.org/ala/
aboutala/offices/oif/firstamendment/courtcases/courtcases.cfm (last visited Apr.
7, 2011) (noting that parties reached settlement outside of court).
88. 908 F. Supp. 864 (D. Kan. 1995), affd in part, rev'd on other grounds in part,
157 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 1998).
89. See id. at 866-67 (describing situation leading to controversy). Prior to the
donation, several copies of the novel were already included in the library collec-
tion. See id. at 867 (providing details of case). The school also received a donation
of a second novel entitled All American Boys, but chose not to accept the donation
upon determining that its content was not inappropriate. See id. at 867-68 (describ-
ing facts of case).
90. See id. at 867-68 (explaining circumstances of book review). The court
noted that the book "contain[ed] no vulgarity, offensive language, or explicit sex-
ual content." Id. at 867 (providing results of book review).
91. See id. at 868 (describing book removal decision).
92. See id. at 870-72 (explaining removal decision).
93. See id. at 865 (explaining procedural posture of case).
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The Case court recognized that the Supreme Court directly addressed
the public school library book removal issue in Pico, and determined that
it was appropriate to apply the plurality decision in the absence of a more
fitting alternative. 94 Although the board asserted that it removed the
book as educationally inappropriate, the court concluded that the board
violated Pico by endorsing the removal based on member disagreement
with the ideas represented in the book.9 5 The court found overwhelming
evidence that the board engaged in viewpoint discrimination, including
the board's statements expressing disagreement with the book's content,
the board's disregard for proper library book challenge procedures, and
the board's failure to consider alternatives before removing the novel.9 6
Accordingly, the court held that the board's actions violated the First
Amendment and ordered the book's return to the library.9 7
Restrictions upon public school library materials also raised constitu-
tional concerns in Counts v. Cedarville School District.9 8 In response to a
complaint regarding the inclusion of the book Harry Potter and the Sorcerer's
Stone in the Cedarville School District's libraries, a library committee re-
viewed the book and concluded that it should remain in circulation."
The school board instead voted to remove the book from the library
shelves and to require signed parental permission to access the entire
Harry Potter series, alleging that it restricted access to the books out of fear
that the series might cause student disobedience, and because the books
involved witchcraft.10 0 A student and her parents brought suit, claiming
that the restrictions violated the First Amendment. 0 1
The Counts court acknowledged that Pico instructs that First Amend-
ment rights directly correlate with the right to receive information in
books and provides enhanced protection for the exercise of this right in
public school libraries. 10 2 Applying Pico, the court determined that the
94. See id. at 875 (determining that Pico is correct standard to apply in public
school library book removal cases).
95. See id. at 875-76 (dismissing school board's alleged reasons for book
removal).
96. See id. (reasoning school board removed book because members dis-
agreed with book's content). The court explained that the school board's author-
ity to exercise discretion in removing library books did not permit removals
predicated upon "their personal social, political, and moral views." Id. at 876. The
court also determined that the notion that the book was available outside of the
school library did not justify the book's removal. See id. (stating that argument
regarding availability of book outside school fails to address improper motivation
for removal).
97. See id. at 877 (holding that school board removed book impermissibly).
98. 295 F. Supp. 2d 996 (W.D. Ark. 2003).
99. See id. at 1000-01 (describing circumstances of controversy).
100. See id. at 1001-02 (explaining that school board restricted access to
books).
101. See id. at 997 (providing procedural posture of case).
102. See id. at 999 (recognizing Pico's acknowledgement of special rights in
public school library context).
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board's allegations were speculative, as most board members had not read
the challenged book and no board members had read the other books in
the series. 0 3 The court found that the board endeavored to restrict ac-
cess to materials believed to promote a religion with which its members
disagreed.1 0 4 Accordingly, the court held that the board violated the stu-
dent's First Amendment rights.10 5
Presently, courts lack definitive guidance on how to analyze public
school library book removal cases.106 Nevertheless, lower court decisions
reveal a consensus that Pico is the correct standard to apply, and that it is
essential to assess the reasoning behind a removal decision to discern
whether the removal is truly justified.10 7 When considering the propriety
of a book removal, courts should apply Pico and interpret it to require a
thorough inquiry into the motivating factors behind the removal
decision.'os
III. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT "CHECKS OUT" PIco
A. Facts and Procedural Background
The Miami-Dade controversy arose during the 2006 school year when
library shelves in the schools of the Miami-Dade County Public School Dis-
trict contained several copies of the children's book series A Visit to .. .109
Each book in the series provided a basic introduction to the geography
and culture of a particular country.11 0 Juan Amador, the father of a
Miami-Dade elementary school student and a former political prisoner of
Cuba, complained that the book A Visit to Cuba should be removed from
103. See id. at 1003-04 (finding that school board acted impermissibly under
Pico).
104. See id. at 1004 (reasoning that school board members intentionally acted
to deny access to ideas that they disagreed with).
105. See id. at 1005 (holding that board's decision violated constitutional
guarantees).
106. See Am. Civil Liberties Union of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cty. Sch. Bd.,
557 F.3d 1177, 1202 (11th Cir. 2009) (acknowledging that it is uncertain how
courts should analyze public school library book removal cases), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 659.
107. See Achtman, supra note 34, at 963 (explaining that courts addressing
public school library book removals regularly apply Pico). For a further discussion
of how lower courts have applied Pico in public school library book cases, see supra
notes 77-105 and accompanying text.
108. See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871-72 (1982) (plurality opinion)
(prohibiting public school library book removal decision made by improperly mo-
tivated school board).
109. See Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d at 1182 (describing circumstances leading to
dispute). The libraries' collections also included Spanish versions of certain books
in the series. See id. at 1183 (detailing nature of disputed books). The Spanish
version of the English book A Visit to Cuba was entitled iVamos a Cuba! See id.
(describing challenged books).
110. See id. at 1182-83 (explaining books' content).
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his daughter's school library.'" Mr. Amador asserted that the book dis-
torted Cuba and he advocated replacing it with one that explicitly con-
veyed the trials of Cuban life. 1 12
In accordance with the school district's procedure for library book
challenges, Mr. Amador requested a formal review of the book." 3 The
school's book review committee acknowledged that the book was educa-
tionally significant and appropriate, and advised the superintendent to re-
tain the library book.114 Mr. Amador appealed to a second review
committee that also voted in favor of retaining the book after evaluating
the text for educational significance, appropriateness, and accuracy."15
Dissatisfied, Mr. Amador appealed to the Miami-Dade County School
Board (the Board)."16 The Board agreed with Mr. Amador's opinion that
the book failed to sufficiently convey the difficulties of Cuban life.' 17 Sig-
nificantly, several Board members also expressed that they found the book
personally offensive.118 Disregarding the prior evaluations of the book,
111. See id. at 1183 (providing circumstances of dispute). The school district
had an established procedure in place to address requests to remove books from
the schools' libraries. See id. at 1184 (acknowledging school district's book chal-
lenge procedure). First, the complaint was to be reviewed by the school principal,
who then was to either provide an explanation of the book's inclusion in the li-
brary collection or require a formal request to have the book removed. See id.
(explaining book challenge procedure). Next, an ad hoc review committee com-
prised of members of the school community was to review the challenged book to
recommend to the principal whether or not the book should be removed from the
library. See id. (describing school district's book challenge process). To make its
decision, the review committee was to consult reviews of the text by professionals
and library experts and also consider "fifteen criteria for selecting library materials:
educational significance, appropriateness, accuracy, literary merit, scope, author-
ity, special features, translation integrity, arrangement, treatment, technical qual-
ity, aesthetic quality, potential demand, durability, and lack of obscene material."
Id. One could challenge the review committee's decision by appealing to the su-
perintendent, who had the discretion to follow the review committee's recommen-
dation or have the book reviewed by a second review committee. See id.
(explaining book challenge process). Finally, one could appeal the superinten-
dent's decision for a final review of the book by the school board. See id. (describ-
ing how book challenge reaches school board).
112. See id. at 1182 (explaining why Mr. Amador challenged book).
113. See id. at 1184 (noting that formal book review took place).
114. See id. at 1185 (explaining results of book review).
115. See id. (providing details of second book review).
116. See id. at 1185 (describing Mr. Amador's response to committee's recom-
mendations). The Board held a public hearing to receive input from the commu-
nity to aid in its assessment of the book. See id. (explaining Board's hearing
process).
117. See id. at 1185-88 (describing Board's assessment of book).
118. See id. at 1185-87 (providing circumstances of Board's deliberations).
The Board's chairman openly declared that "it's in [the book's] lack of informa-
tion that I think we as the Cuban community are offended." Id. at 1185 (quoting
Transcript of Record at 13, Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d 1177 (No. 06-14633)). Another
member asserted that the book was "'extremely offensive.'" Id. at 1186 (quoting
Transcript of Record at 17, Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d 1177 (No. 06-14633)). For a
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the Board alleged that A Visit to Cuba was factually inaccurate and decided
to remove the series from the school libraries. 1 9
In response, the American Civil Liberties Union and Miami-Dade
County Student Government Association filed a complaint in the South-
ern District of Florida seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the
Board and the superintendent, alleging violations of their First Amend-
ment and due process rights. 120 The court determined that: A Visit to
Cuba was educationally suitable for children; the Board pretextually al-
leged that the book was factually inaccurate; and the Board removed the
books to prevent access to their ideas.' 2 1 Therefore, the Board acted im-
permissibly under Pico.122 Concluding that the plaintiffs were likely to suc-
ceed on their claims, the court issued a preliminary injunction requiring
the Board to return the books to the libraries and prohibiting future re-
movals of the books.' 23
The Board subsequently appealed the district court's decision. 124
The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded
the case, finding that a preliminary injunction was not warranted because
the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their claims.' 2 5 The court de-
nied rehearing, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.126
B. The Eleventh Circuit's Reasoning
1. The Majority Opinion
In Miami-Dade, the central issue before the Eleventh Circuit was the
propriety of the district court's decision to issue the preliminary injunc-
tion.12 7 Accordingly, the court proceeded to assess whether the plaintiffs
further discussion of comments made by Board members while determining
whether to remove the book, see infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
119. See Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d at 1188 (explaining Board's decision).
120. See id. (providing procedural posture of case). After the defendants filed
a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to
include Mark Balzli as an individual and on behalf of his son Aidan, a student in
the Miami-Dade County School District. See id. at 1188-89 (explaining procedural
posture of case).
121. See id. at 1203, 1225 (providing district court's findings).
122. See id. at 1189-90 (describing district court's decision). For a discussion
of Pico, see supra notes 40-59 and accompanying text.
123. See Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d at 1189-90 (explaining district court's result).
124. See id. at 1190 (providing procedural posture of case).
125. See id. at 1230 (describing Eleventh Circuit's decision). For a discussion
of the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in Miami-Dade, see infra notes 127-50 and ac-
companying text.
126. See Miami-Dade, 346 F. App'x 574 (11th Cir. 2009) (denying rehearing en
banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 659.
127. See Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d at 1198 (explaining issues court needed to ad-
dress). Before addressing the preliminary injunction issue, the Eleventh Circuit
assessed the threshold requirement of whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring
the action. See id. at 1189 (analyzing plaintiffs' standing). To have standing, it is
required that the plaintiff "'suffered, or must face an imminent and not merely
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demonstrated a "substantial likelihood of success on their claims."128 The
court explained that to do so, it was necessary to review de novo the dis-
trict court's legal conclusions necessitating the preliminary injunction as
well as the essential constitutional facts at issue.1 29
hypothetical prospect of suffering, an invasion of a legally protected interest result-
ing in a 'concrete and particularized' injury. [T]he injury must have been caused
by the defendant's complained-of actions [and] must likely be redressible by a
favorable court decision.'" Id. at 1190 (quoting Fla. State Conf. of the NAACP v.
Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1159 (11th Cir. 2008)) (explaining requirements for
standing).
The court determined that the plaintiffs satisfied the requirements for stand-
ing as to A Visit to Cuba, but not for the remaining books in the series. See id. at
1197-98 (explaining findings on standing issue). The court found that the individ-
ual plaintiff, Mr. Balzli, satisfied the requirements for standing as to A Visit to Cuba
because he and his son intended to check out the book from the library on the
first day of the upcoming school year and the removal of the book from the library
would impede his legal right to access the book. See id. at 1194-95 (providing
court's reasoning). As a result, the court decided that it was unnecessary to deter-
mine whether the other plaintiffs also had standing. See id. at 1195 (explaining
rationale as to standing of other plaintiffs). Yet, because Mr. Balzli only intended
to check out A Visit to Cuba, the plaintiffs did not satisfy the standing requirements
for the remaining books in the series. See id. at 1197-98 (providing findings on
standing issue). Therefore, the plaintiffs could challenge the removal of A Visit to
Cuba, but could not challenge the removal of the other books in the series. See id.
(explaining determination of plaintiffs' standing).
128. Id. at 1198 (noting standard of review). Preliminary injunctive relief is
warranted when a movant demonstrates:
(1) it has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable
injury will be suffered unless the injunction issues; (3) the threatened
injury to the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunc-
tion may cause the opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would
not be adverse to the public interest.
Id. (quoting Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc))
(providing requirements that must be met to uphold preliminary injunction).
129. See id. (explaining standard of review applied by court). Typically, an
appellate court reviewing a district court's decision is bound to accept findings of
fact made by the district court unless the findings are clearly erroneous. See
THOMAS, supra note 27, at 19 (summarizing appellate standard of review). In con-
trast, a district court's legal conclusions require less deference and may be inde-
pendently reexamined by an appellate court. See id. (noting differing review
standards for findings of fact and conclusions of law). In First Amendment cases it
is also necessary to "review de novo the core constitutional fact[s]." Miami-Dade, 557
F.3d at 1198 (providing exception to general standard of review with regard to
constitutional facts). As such, the Miami-Dade court determined to independently
review the constitutional facts at issue. See id. (concluding that constitutional facts
merit de novo review).
To determine how to review the district court's decision, the Miami-Dade court
assessed the nature of other courts' reviews in First Amendment cases. See id. at
1203-06 (discussing other courts' treatment of standards of review). For instance,
the Supreme Court upheld an appellate court's determination that there was in-
sufficient evidence that a publishing company published an article containing a
false fact with actual malice in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. See
466 U.S. 485, 514 (1984) (affirming appellate court's decision). The Court held
that the appellate court correctly reviewed the record independently to assess the
actual malice issue and that the appellate court was not limited to reviewing the
district court's findings for clear error. See id. at 513-14 (explaining proper stan-
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dard of review on appeal). The Court reasoned that "in cases raising First Amend-
ment issues we have repeatedly held 'that an appellate court has an obligation to
'make an independent examination of the whole record' in order to make sure
that 'the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free
expression."' Id. at 499 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
284-86 (1964)) (explaining that constitutional issues merit different review stan-
dard). Yet, the Court stressed the need to independently review evidence strictly
concerning "the dispositive constitutional issue." Id. at 508 (clarifying proper
scope of review). Further, the Court provided that it was necessary to engage in
"an independent assessment only of the evidence germane to the ... determina-
tion." Id. at 514 n.31 (providing guidance on nature of review).
The Miami-Dade court also turned to the case Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Les-
bian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995). See Miami-Dade, 557 F.39 at
1205 (considering Supreme Court's Hurley case). In that case, the Supreme Court
assessed whether a parade sponsor had the right to deny a homosexual organiza-
tion authorization to march in the sponsor's private holiday parade. See Hurley,
515 U.S. at 560-66 (describing facts of case). The Court concluded that the lower
court's determination that the state's mandate for the parade sponsor to permit
the organization to participate violated the sponsor's First Amendment rights. See
id. at 566 (holding that constitutional violation occurred). To assess the First
Amendment issue, the Court conducted an independent examination of the re-
cord, stressing that the Court was "obliged to make a fresh examination of crucial
facts" pertaining to the constitutional issue. Id. at 567 (explaining need to ex-
amine essential constitutional facts independently).
The Miami-Dade court also turned to prior Eleventh Circuit cases for gui-
dance. See Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d at 1198-206 (examining other cases within circuit).
For example, the Eleventh Circuit reversed a district court's decision that a city's
regulation that prohibited the display of multiple portable signs violated the First
Amendment in Don's Porta Signs, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 829 F.2d 1051, 1051-54
(11th Cir. 1987) (reversing district court's decision). The district court in Don's
Porta Signs found that the city's portable and permanent signs were similarly unat-
tractive, and that the restriction on portable signs only would not greatly enhance
the government's interest because the permanent signs would also disrupt the
community's aesthetic quality. See id. at 1053 (providing district court's findings).
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit maintained that under Bose Corp., it had the au-
thority to independently examine the record because the case concerned a First
Amendment claim. See id. at 1053 n.9 (providing court's reasoning). The court
determined that the regulation was part of a "comprehensive effort to improve the
City's appearance" and that because the portable signs were unattractive, the regu-
lation "furthered the City's interest in improving the visual character of the City."
Id. at 1053 (explaining court's findings). In its independent review of the record,
the court limited its review to the specific constitutional issue of whether the regu-
lation furthered the city's interest and not the specific factual matter of whether
the portable signs were more aesthetically pleasing than the permanent signs. See
id. (describing standard of review used by court).
Finally, the Miami-Dade court considered Coalition for the Abolition of Marijuana
Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2000). See Miami-Dade, 557
F.3d at 1205 (examining Coal. for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition case to guide
court's reasoning). In that case, the Eleventh Circuit assessed whether an ordi-
nance that enabled a city to deny a marijuana advocacy group a permit to hold an
outdoor festival violated the group's First Amendment rights. See Coal. for the Aboli-
tion ofMarijuana Prohibition, 219 F.3d at 1305-06 (describing issue before court).
Although the district court found that the ordinance did not infringe upon the
group's constitutional rights, on appeal the Eleventh Circuit engaged in a de novo
review of constitutional facts. See id. at 1316-17 (determining to review constitu-
tional facts de novo). The court found that the ordinance was constitutional after
reviewing de novo the specific constitutional requirements that the ordinance be
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First, the court addressed the plaintiff's First Amendment claim. 130
The plaintiffs maintained that Pico was the proper standard to apply, while
the Board contended that Kuhlmeier should be applied.'3 1 The court ac-
knowledged the uncertainty in the law regarding which standard governs
in public school library book removal cases.13 2 Nevertheless, the court
applied the Pico standard, which prohibits a school board book removal
decision based on board members' personal disagreement with the ideas
expressed.13 3 Recognizing that "the Board's motive is the ultimate fact
upon which the resolution of the constitutional question depends," the
court determined to review the Board's motive de novo.134
The Eleventh Circuit found that factual inaccuracies in the book mo-
tivated the Board's decision.' 3 5 By reviewing the book's educational suita-
bility de novo, the court determined that "the book indisputably . . .
contain[ed] inaccuracies."13 6 Also, the court found that the book did not
accurately convey the harsh reality of life in Cuba. 3 7 Based on its assess-
ment of the book's factual inaccuracies, the court disregarded the district
court's conclusion that the Board's decision was motivated by members'
disagreement with the book's viewpoint.13 8 In light of these findings, the
content-neutral, narrowly tailored, and leave open alternative means of communi-
cation. See id. at 1316-24, 1326 (reviewing constitutional facts de novo).
130. See Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d at 1199-200 (addressing First Amendment
claim).
131. See id. (noting that parties disagreed on standard court should apply).
For a discussion of Pico and Kuhlmeier, see supra notes 40-73 and accompanying
text.
132. See Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d at 1202 ("The question of what standard applies
to school library book removal decisions is unresolved.").
133. See id. (providing Pico standard). For a discussion of Pico, see supra notes
40-59 and accompanying text.
134. See Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d at 1204-06 (explaining that reason for Board's
decision was core constitutional fact that needed to be reviewed de novo).
135. See id. at 1207-11 (determining book was factually inaccurate upon re-
viewing book's educational suitability de novo and that factual inaccuracy moti-
vated Board's decision). But see id. at 1233-34 (Wilson,J., dissenting) (finding that
factual inaccuracy allegations were pretextual and that Board's true motivation be-
hind removal was to deny access to ideas in book). The majority reasoned that it
was necessary to independently review the book's educational suitability because
the Board's alleged motivation for removing the book pertained to the book's fac-
tual accuracy. See id. at 1211 (majority opinion) (determining to review de novo
book's factual accuracy).
136. See id. at 1211 (finding that book contained factual inaccuracies). Partic-
ularly, the court reasoned that the book made imprecise assertions about Cuban
cave paintings, traditional Cuban boat races, and Cuban clothing. See id. at 1212
(providing mistakes in book). The court also reasoned that the book inaccurately
proclaimed that "'People in Cuba eat, work, and go to school like you do."' Id.
(quoting Transcript of Record Exhibit A Visit to Cuba at 13, Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d
1177 (No. 06-14633)).
137. See id. at 1221 (concluding that book did not fully express difficulties of
Cuban life).
138. See id. at 1217, 1225 (rejecting district court's findings). The Eleventh
Circuit heavily criticized the district court's analysis. See id. at 1217-25 (finding
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court found that the Board acted within its authority to make educational
decisions and concluded that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on
their First Amendment claim.1 3 9
Finally, the court addressed the due process claim.140 The court rea-
soned that the action taken to challenge A Visit to Cuba followed the school
district's established procedures.1 4 1 Accordingly, the plaintiffs had notice
and an opportunity to be heard, therefore precluding a viable due process
claim.14 2 Thus, finding neither a First Amendment nor a due process vio-
lation, the Eleventh Circuit determined that injunctive relief was inappro-
priate. 143 The court vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded
the case.' 44
2. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissent passionately objected to the majority's analysis of the First
Amendment claim.14 5 According to the dissent, the majority erroneously
reviewed factual findings de novo that should have been reviewed only for
clear error.' 4 6 Particularly, the majority should not have independently
assessed the book's factual accuracy and should have given greater defer-
ence to the district court's findings that the book conveyed a simplified
fault in district court's reasoning). Unlike the district court, the Eleventh Circuit
perceived the Board members' experiences pertaining to Cuba as an "interest" in
the situation and not as indicative of improper motivation behind the Board's de-
cision. See id. at 1224 (dismissing potential that Board members' expenence im-
properly influenced removal decision). The court also criticized the district
court's analysis by vigorously denying that removing the book from the library con-
stituted book "banning." See id. at 1217 (disagreeing with notion that removing
book from library constitutes book banning). Further, the court expressed that
books' educational suitability is not a matter for courts to contemplate. See id. at
1225 (disapproving district courts' involvement in educational matters).
139. See id. at 1225-27 (determining plaintiffs' First Amendment claim was not
likely to succeed).
140. See id. at 1228-30 (addressing plaintiffs' due process claim). Due process
requires "that one be given notice and an opportunity to be heard." Id. at 1229
(citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985)) (explain-
ing due process requirements).
141. See id. at 1228-30 (assessing due process claim). The court also found
that the Board reasonably interpreted its procedures regarding library book chal-
lenges. See id. (examining due process issue). For a further discussion of the
school district's procedure to address library book challenges and on how the chal-
lenge of A Visit to Cuba proceeded, see supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text.
142. See Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d at 1228-30 (finding that due process violation
did not occur).
143. See id. at 1230 (concluding that plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on
claims).
144. See id. (rejecting preliminary injunction decision).
145. See id. at 1230, 1232-35 (Wilson, J., dissenting) ("The First Amendment
prevents the government from banning books from school libraries, except in lim-
ited circumstances not present here.").
146. See id. at 1232 ("The majority overstep[ped] the applicable standard of
review and engage[d] in de novo review with regard to many factual findings.").
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account of Cuba that was age-appropriate and politically neutral.147
Under the clear error standard, the dissent maintained that the district
court accurately found that the Board's actions violated the First Amend-
ment.1 4 8 Criticizing the majority for ignoring evidence in the record dem-
onstrating the Board members' impermissible motives, the dissent argued
that a thorough review of the record revealed that "the School Board en-
gaged in viewpoint discrimination, and that ... was the decisive factor in
its motivation."' 4 9 Thus, the dissent concluded that the Board's removal
decision could not be justified.' 5 o
IV. MIAMI-DADE: STUDENTS' RIGHTS PLACED "ON HOLD"
The Miami-Dade court erred by determining that the plaintiffs were
unlikely to succeed on their First Amendment claim and, therefore, ena-
bled an unconstitutional suppression of ideas.15 1 Although the court
showed promise by applying Pico, the court's analysis under the standard
was flawed.152 By not fully applying Pico's directives, by overlooking key
aspects of the record, and by exceeding the proper scope of review, the
court improperly determined that the Board decided to remove A Visit to
Cuba because it contained factual inaccuracies.' 5 3 As a result, the court
denied access to constitutionally protected ideas.1 5 4
147. See id. at 1223-35 (maintaining that district court's decision should have
been given more deference).
148. See id. at 1234-48 (arguing that record contained sufficient evidence to
uphold district court's decision). The dissent acknowledged that Kuhlmeier was
"more lenient" than Pico, and further analyzed the removal under Kuhlmeier to
demonstrate that the board's actions could not be justified even under a less strict
standard. See id. at 1234 (analyzing case under Kuhlmeier).
149. Id. at 1233-34 (finding that record demonstrated Board made decision to
deny access to ideas in book). The record showed that the Board expressed disa-
greement with the book's neutral portrayal of Cuba. See id. at 1240-43 (explaining
that record showed that Board disfavored book's content). Further, the circum-
stances surrounding the decision revealed that the Board faced political and com-
munity pressure to remove the book, that the Board disregarded the advice of
professional educators, and that the Board initially attempted to circumvent book
removal procedures. See id. (reasoning that circumstances support finding that
Board made improper decision).
150. See id. at 1234-48 (finding that Board's decision was illegitimate).
151. For a discussion of how the Miami-Dade court's analysis was flawed, see
infra notes 164-82 and accompanying text.
152. For a discussion of why the court was correct to apply Pico, see infra notes
154-63 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the court's unsound review
under Pico, see infra notes 164-82 and accompanying text.
153. For a discussion of the flaws in the court's analysis, see infra notes 164-82
and accompanying text.
154. See Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d at 1232 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (asserting that
Miami-Dade majority result is unjustified); Achtman, supra note 34, at 997 (main-
taining that Miami-Dade result is erroneous and does not accord with constitutional
guarantees). For a discussion of how the court's decision is unwarranted, see infra
notes 164-82 and accompanying text.
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A. The Eleventh Circuit "Borrowed " from the Proper Supreme Court Standard
The Eleventh Circuit correctly selected Pico as the proper standard for
public school library book removal cases.' 55 In similar cases, courts have
consistently applied Pico as the authoritative legal standard.15 6 Although
its status as a plurality decision lessens its precedential value, Pico is consid-
erably influential because it is the only Supreme Court case to directly
address the issue.1 57 Moreover, it is proper to apply the narrowest concur-
ring opinion of a plurality decision, and Pico's narrowest concurrence is
consistent with the plurality's direction to assess a school board's motiva-
tion.' 58 Accordingly, it is appropriate to apply Pico in the absence of a
fitting Supreme Court majority decision.15 9
Although the Eleventh Circuit contemplated using Kuhlmeier, the
court rightfully chose to instead apply Pico.1 6 0 Unlike Pico, Kuhmeier ap-
155. See Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d at 1199 (majority opinion) (applying Pico in
public school library book removal case); see also Peltz, supra note 6, at 103 (charac-
terizing Pico as "the Supreme Court's leading pronouncement upon and against
censorship in public [school] libraries"). For a discussion of why the court was
correct to apply Pico, see infra notes 156-64 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 64 F.3d 184, 189 (5th
Cir. 1995) (applying Pico standard); Counts v. Cedarville Sch. Dist., 295 F. Supp. 2d
996, 999, 1004 (W.D. Ark. 2003) (same); Case v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 908 F.
Supp. 864, 874-75 (D. Kan. 1995) (same); see also Brownstein, supra note 61, at 755
("Most cases involving the removal of books from school libraries are reviewed
under Pico . . . .").
157. See Campbell, 64 F.3d at 189 (asserting that although Pico is plurality deci-
sion, case still "may properly serve as guidance in determining whether the School
Board's removal decision was based on unconstitutional motives"); Case, 908 F.
Supp. at 875 ("[Pico] is the only Supreme Court decision dealing specifically with
the removal of books from a public school library."); see also THOMAS, supra note
27, at 84 (explaining that Pico is influential as only Supreme Court decision ad-
dressing censorship in public school libraries). For a further discussion of the pro-
priety of applying plurality decisions, see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
158. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (instructing that it is
appropriate to apply narrowest concurring opinion of plurality decision); Campbell,
64 F.3d at 189 ("Justice White's concurrence in Pico represents the narrowest
grounds for the result in that case, and it does not reject the plurality's assessment
of the constitutional limitations on school officials' discretion to remove books
from a school library."); Achtman, supra note 34, at 982 (explaining thatJustice
White's concurring opinion in Pico supports majority's assertion that book removal
mandated by school board with improper motivation violates Constitution and that
removal decision is reviewable by court). For a further discussion of the Pico deci-
sion, see supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the applica-
tion of plurality decisions, see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
159. See Case, 908 F. Supp. at 875 (applying Pico because it is only Supreme
Court decision addressing public school library book removals); see also Achtman,
supra note 34, at 982 (advocating that Pico plurality's direction to assess school
board motivation in public school library book removal cases applies because nar-
rowest concurring opinion corresponds with plurality's direction).
160. See Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d at 1202 (deciding to analyze facts of case under
Pico instead of Kuhlmeier); see also Brownstein, supra note 61, at 755 (noting most
courts apply Pico in public school library book removal cases).
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plies only to curricular matters.' 6 ' Kuhlmeier should not apply in cases
concerning public school library book removals because school libraries
are distinct from school curricula.16 2 Moreover, in similar public school
library book removal cases, other courts have expressly declined to apply
Kuhlmeier.'63 As such, Pico remains the sole Supreme Court case that di-
rectly addresses public school library book removals and is the proper
standard to apply in such cases.'on
B. The Miami-Dade Court "Read" Pico Imprecisely
Although the court properly decided to apply Pico, it distorted the
Pico standard into one analogous to Kuhlmeier by limiting its analysis to the
book's educational suitability.16 5 Upon determining that the book con-
161. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273-74 (1988) (ex-
plaining that decision pertains to curricular matters); see also Heins, supra note 3,
at 165 (expressing that Kuhlmeier applies to curricular decisions and does not re-
solve uncertainty over Pico's role in cases concerning public school libraries).
Prior treatment of Kuhlmeier in the Eleventh Circuit sheds light on the appropriate
application of the Supreme Court standard. See Virgil v. Sch. Bd., 862 F.2d 1517,
1522 (11th Cir. 1989) (applying Kuhimeier). In Virgil, the Eleventh Circuit found
that under Kuhlmeier, a school board's decision to remove a textbook from a high
school class was justified because the book was vulgar and sexually explicit. See id.
at 1523 (upholding book removal from high school class). The court stressed that
it applied Kuhlmeier because the "textbook [was] used in a regularly scheduled
course of study in the school" and thus "part of the school curriculum." Id. at 1522
(using Kuhlmeier standard to assess removal of textbook from classroom). Upon
electing to apply Kuhlmeier, the court maintained that it made "no suggestion as to
the appropriate standard to be applied in a case where one party has demon-
strated that removal stemmed from opposition to the ideas contained in the dis-
puted materials," but nevertheless explicitly declined to apply Pico. Id. at 1523 n.8
(declining to apply Pico).
162. See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 869 (1982) (plurality opinion)
(distinguishing school libraries and school curricula); see also Roberts v. Madigan,
702 F. Supp. 1505, 1513 (D. Colo. 1989) (differentiating school library from class-
room), aff'd, 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990); Heins, supra note 3, at 165-66 (assert-
ing that educators' authority to make decisions based on educational concerns as
provided in Kuhlmeier does not justify removing books from school library to pro-
mote certain values); Peltz, supra note 6, at 157 ("Characterizing the library as a
curricular endeavor . . . jeopardize[es] both the library's tangible resources and
intangible intellectual freedom."); Munic, supra note 4, at 236-39 (arguing that
freedom of inquiry made possible by school library distinguishes library from
school curriculum and thus requires enhanced protections).
163. See Campbell, 64 F.3d at 189, 189 n.29 (maintaining that curriculum and
school library are distinct and noting that Kuhlmeier applies only in curricular con-
text); Case, 895 F. Supp. at 1469 (determining that Kuhlmeier "is distinguishable
from the present case because [Kuhlmeier] was a curriculum case" and is thus is not
applicable to public school library book removal case). Other courts that assessed
public school library book removal decisions did not apply Kuhlmeier. See, e.g.,
Counts v. Cedarville Sch. Dist., 295 F. Supp. 2d 996, 999 (W.D. Ark. 2003) (apply-
ing Pico rather than Kuhlmeier).
164. See Case, 908 F. Supp. at 875 (characterizing Pico as only Supreme Court
case directly applicable to public school library book removals).
165. See Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d at 1225-26 (finding that book removal was justi-
fied because book was not educationally suitable); see also Lindsay M. Saxe, Com-
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tained factual inaccuracies, the court accepted this justification as the
Board's motivation without hesitation and quickly dismissed the potential
that other factors provoked the decision.' 66 Such a limited focus is inade-
quate, for it fails to fully contemplate the motivating factors behind a re-
moval as Pico requires. 67 Moreover, interpreting Pico to allow alleged
educational concerns to preclude assessment of other motivating factors is
inconsistent with the consensus reached by several other courts in prior
decisions, demonstrating the necessity of fully inquiring into the motiva-
tion behind a book removal.' 6 8 Although the court purported to apply
Pico, it in effect applied the Kuhlmeier standard and evaded necessary con-
sideration of other potential motivating factors behind the Board's
decision.169
Had the court properly applied Pico by continuing to inquire into the
Board's decision to ensure that the book's educational suitability was the
sole motivating factor, the court would have recognized that the Board's
decision could not be justified.17 0 Although the court purported to fully
examine the record, a thorough analysis of factors considered by the dis-
trict court reveals that the majority disregarded statements indicative of
Board members' personal views that the book was offensive.1 7 ' Particu-
ment, Politics Versus Precision: Did the Miami-Dade School Board Violate the First
Amendment When It Voted to Remove ;Vamos a Cuba! from Its District Libraries?: ACLU v.
Miami-Dade County School Board, 557 F.3d 1177 (11th Cir. 2009), 61 Fu. L. REv.
921, 930 (2009) (noting that Miami-Dade court deemed book's alleged factual inac-
curacy as adequate justification for removal). For a discussion of how the Eleventh
Circuit distorted Pico, see infra notes 166-83 and accompanying text.
166. See Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d at 1211 (accepting factually inaccuracies as ade-
quate justification for book removal decision).
167. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 870-71 (plurality opinion) (requiring that intention
behind decision to remove library book be taken into account).
168. See, e.g., Campbell, 64 F.3d at 188-90 (stressing importance of adequately
analyzing motivation behind book removal decision); Counts, 295 F. Supp. 2d at
1004-05 (declining to accept alleged justifications for book removal and fully ex-
amining factors contributing to removal decision); Case 908 F. Supp. at 874-76 (as-
sessing motivation behind removal in spite of allegations book was removed
because it was educationally unsuitable).
169. See Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d at 1240 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (arguing that
majority did not adequately assess motivation behind removal decision); cf Case,
908 F. Supp. at 875 (continuing analysis to fully examine school board's motivation
for removal even after school board claimed to base removal decision on book's
educational suitability).
170. See Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d at 1233-48 (Wilson,J., dissenting) ("The record
supports the conclusion that the School Board was not merely interested in remov-
ing a book full of inaccuracies; it was motivated to remove a book that symbolically
represented something with which it disagreed."); see also Saxe, supra note 165, at
930 (recognizing that court discounted information in record suggestive of im-
proper motivation).
171. See Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d at 1233 (Wilson,J., dissenting) (explaining that
majority "ignores various statements made by School Board members which sug-
gest and sometimes even admit impermissible motives in the removal decision");
Achtman, supra note 34, at 995 (noting that court did not consider information
from record revealing board members made personal and politically charged com-
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larly at odds with Pico's directives, one Board member explicitly explained
that he voted to remove the book not because of its factual inaccuracies,
but rather "'for the cause."' 17 2 The apparent political influence upon the
decision refutes the possibility that the book's educational suitability was
the sole factor that motivated the removal.1 7 3 Thus, the alleged basis of the
Board's decision was not legitimate under a proper application of Pico.174
Furthermore, the dissent perceptively observed that the court based
its decision on an unwarranted determination that the book was educa-
tionally unsuitable.' 75 The court made clear that its de novo review of
ments during deliberations). The dissent observed that the Board's statements
effectively "demonstrate[ed] ideological opposition to the Castro regime. . . .
While [the Board members'] viewpoints may be correct, [there is] no support in
the law for the state requiring a book to carry a political viewpoint." Miami-Dade,
557 F.3d at 1238-39 (assessing Board members' statements). For example, Board
member Mr. Bolanos insistently maintained that the book distorted reality by as-
serting that "[t]he people of Cuba eat, work and study like you." Id. at 1239-40
(quoting Transcript of Record Exhibit A Visit to Cuba at 5, Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d
1177 (No. 06-14633)). He stressed that the only jobs available to Cubans were
those under the communist regime, that the communist party rationed food in
Cuba, and that Cubans were not able to freely practice their religions. See id. at
1238 (describing Mr. Bolanos's statement). Mr. Bolanos argued that by omitting
such information, the book was inaccurate, "hurtful[,] and insulting." Id. at 1239.
Other Board members demonstrated similar sentiments. See id. (describing
Board members' viewpoints). For example, Board member Ms. Logan noted her
desire to remove the book because she "'suffered [in Cuba] firsthand.'" Id. (quot-
ing Transcript of Record at 20-22, Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d 1177 (No. 06-14633)).
Also, Board member Ms. Hantman justified her position in favor of removal by
noting that "'[she] suffered and [her] family suffered with the rise of Fidel Cas-
tro."' Id. (quoting Transcript of Record at 17-18, Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d 1177 (No.
06-14633)). Board member Ms. Perez proclaimed that the book was "'especially
damaging to the sensibilities of this community.'" Id. (quoting Transcript of Re-
cord at 7-9, Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d 1177 (No. 06-14633)). Moreover, Board member
Mr. Barrera expressed that the book was "'offensive to us as a community.'" Id. at
1239-40 (quoting Transcript of Record at 11-18, Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d 1177 (No.
06-14633)). Another Board member acknowledged, "'We are rejecting the profes-
sional recommendation of our staff based on political imperatives . . . .' Id. at
1242 (quoting Transcript of Record at 5-15, Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d 1177 (No. 06-
14633)).
172. Id. at 1209 n.7 (majority opinion) (quoting Transcript of Record at 459-
60, Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d 1177 (No. 06-14633)); see id. at 1234 (Wilson, J., dissent-
ing) (asserting that record demonstrated Board's removal of Visit to Cuba was result
of viewpoint discrimination); see also Achtman, supra note 34, at 997 (maintaining
that Miami-Dade was decided wrongly because Board's decision was result of Board
members' political convictions).
173. See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871 (1982) (plurality opinion)
(providing that educational suitability must be sole reason for removal).
174. See Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d at 1232 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (maintaining
that Board decided to remove book because it disagreed with book's viewpoint).
For a further discussion of why the Board's decision was not justifiable under Pico,
see supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
175. See Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d at 1234-35 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (arguing that
majority did not have authority to assess book's factual accuracy because it was
historical fact already determined by district court).
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facts was limited to the Board's motivation.17 6 Yet, the court imprecisely
extended this review and made de novo assessments of the book's factual
accuracy, a finding of fact that should have been reviewed on appeal only
for clear error.1 7 7 Under the proper standard, the district court's determi-
nation that the book was factually sound had ample support in the record
and should have been upheld.1 7 8 Moreover, the majority stressed that its
decision rested entirely upon its determination that the book contained
factual inaccuracies.' 79 It follows that the court would not have concluded
that factual inaccuracies motivated the Board's decision had the court
given proper deference to the district court's finding that A Visit to Cuba
was factually sound.18 0
Predicated upon a flawed analysis, the Miami-Dade court's decision is
tenuous. 1 8 By distorting Pico, neglecting evidence on the record, and en-
gaging in an overly broad review of the district court's decision, the court
reached an unwarranted result under the First Amendment.18 2 Conse-
quently, the Miami-Dade court permitted an unjustified removal of the
book A Visit to Cuba from the Miami-Dade libraries' shelves.' 8 3
176. See id. at 1198 (majority opinion) (explaining nature of de novo review).
For a discussion of prior Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit decisions that shed
light on the limited breadth of de novo appellate review of constitutional facts, see
supra note 129.
177. See Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d at 1232 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (disagreeing
with standard of review used by majority); see also Saxe, supra note 165, at 928-29
(arguing that "the majority engaged in a de novo review of facts beyond the consti-
tutional fact"). Although it was appropriate to review de novo the Board's motive
for the removal decision, other findings of fact required greater deference. See
Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d at 1232 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (explaining proper standard
of review). The dissent maintained that the majority erroneously extended the de
novo review to include facts beyond the Board's motive. See id. (explaining errors
made by majority). Even if the majority disagreed with the district court's factual
findings, the appellate court was not entitled to review de novo facts other than the
Board's motive. See id. (characterizing majority's review as unwarranted). For fur-
ther discussion of the appropriate scope of appellate de novo review of constitu-
tional facts, see supra notes 129 and 176.
178. See Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d at 1244 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (finding that
review of record under clear error standard supports district court's conclusion).
For a further discussion of the evidence in the record the dissent considered to
determine that the district court's decision was not clearly erroneous, see supra
note 171.
179. See Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d at 1227 (majority opinion) ("We find from the
evidence in this record . . . that [factual] inaccuracies were what motivated the
Board. If there had been no factual inaccuracies, the book would not have been
removed.").
180. See id. at 1232 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (arguing that district court's find-
ing that book was educationally appropriate should be upheld under clear error
standard).
181. See id. (maintaining that majority's result is wrong).
182. For a further discussion of how the majority's decision in Miami-Dade is
flawed, see supra notes 164-81 and accompanying text.
183. See Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d at 1232 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (maintaining
that Miami-Dade's result is not warranted). For a further discussion of why the
result in Miami-Dade is not justified, see supra notes 164-82 and accompanying text.
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V. CHANGE Is "DUE"
Miami-Dade demonstrates that the current standards available to assess
public school library book removals risk enabling First Amendment viola-
tions.18 4 The educational suitability standard under Kuhlmeier should not
be used because it does not consider motivating factors behind removal
decisions.18 5 Although Pico directs that a school board's motivation must
be considered, Miami-Dade shows that Pico can be interpreted in a manner
that enables school boards to construct a pretextual justification.' 8 6 In the
future, courts should avoid reading Pico to afford such an opportunity in
order to prevent jeopardizing students' constitutionally protected
rights.18 7
To adequately protect students' First Amendment guarantees, it is
crucial that future courts do not employ the same analysis as Miami-
Dade.'"8 Allowing a public school library book removal solely because of
educational unsuitability does not ensure the school board removed the
book for proper reasons.18 9 Considering only whether a book is educa-
tionally suitable fails to discern whether improper motivation existed and
thus could enable a pretextual explanation to justify an otherwise unlawful
book removal.19 0 Therefore, the Kuhlmeier standard should not be used in
184. For further discussion of the shortcomings of the current standards, see
infra notes 185-207 and accompanying text.
185. For further discussion of how Kuhlmeier is inadequate, see infra notes
188-91 and accompanying text.
186. For further discussion of how Pico is susceptible to manipulation, see in-
fra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
187. For further discussion of why Pico should be read to prohibit a public
school library book removal when the removal decision involves improper motivat-
ing factors, see infra notes 196-207 and accompanying text.
188. See Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d at 1230 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (arguing that
majority decision did not accord with First Amendment guarantees); see also Bd. of
Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866 (1982) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he First Amend-
ment rights of students may be directly and sharply implicated by the removal of
books from the shelves of a school library.").
189. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 870-71 (expressing need to examine for existence of
factors in addition to educational suitability to assess propriety of public school
library book removal); see also Brownstein, supra note 61, at 813 (stressing that
prohibiting viewpoint discrimination does not accord with Kuhlmeier standard be-
cause educators' viewpoints consistently influence decisions concerning in-school
matters).
190. See Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d at 1244 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (noting that
court neglected to fully analyze motivation behind removal by focusing on assess-
ment of book's educational suitability); see also Pico, 457 U.S. at 890 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) ("'Educational suitability' . . . is a standardless phrase. This conclusion
will undoubtedly be drawn in many-if not most-instances because of the deci-
sionmaker's content-based judgment that the ideas contained in the book or the
idea expressed from the author's method of communication are inappropriate
. . . ."); Gamsky, supra note 35, at 744 (advocating for motivation test when assess-
ing removal decisions because improperly motivated school board could avoid ac-
countability under objective test).
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public school library book removal cases because it does not adequately
ensure the legitimacy of removal decisions.1 9 1
In contrast, Pico rightfully requires courts to assess the motivation be-
hind a school board's removal decision.19 2 Nevertheless, as Miami-Dade
demonstrates, Pico can be interpreted in a manner that does not suffi-
ciently protect students' right to access to information.19 3 Enabling al-
leged educational concerns for a removal decision to preclude full judicial
inquiry into other potential motivating factors fails to protect against ille-
gitimate removals. 194 To avert the risk of constructed justifications, Pico
should be read to prohibit a removal decision when substantial improper
motivation is found even when a potentially legitimate justification is
alleged. 195
With Miami-Dade as precedent for future courts, access to constitu-
tionally protected ideas in public school libraries is at risk.' 96 Miami-Dade
affords school boards the opportunity to intentionally remove books from
191. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 288-90 (1988)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Kuhlmeier majority test does not adequately
protect students' First Amendment rights because "school officials (and courts)
can camouflage viewpoint discrimination" when censoring school materials); see
also Pico, 457 U.S. at 871 (plurality opinion) (stating existence of First Amendment
violation depends on motivation behind library book removals); Brownstein, supra
note 61, at 775-76 ("[T]he range of concerns determined to be 'legitimate' and
'pedagogical' is so broad that one can only wonder whether anything meaningful
is accomplished by requiring courts to ask and answer the question.").
192. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 869 (requiring examination of motivating factors
behind book removal decision to protect against unjustified unshelving).
193. See Achtman, supra note 34, at 997 (arguing that Miami-Dade "perilously
perverts the spirit of Pico's First Amendment protections"); see also Brownstein,
supra note 61, at 754 (noting that lower courts struggle to apply Pico); Munic, supra
note 4, at 246 (stressing need for less ambiguous standard than Pico to protect
against court decisions that enable illegitimate book removals). Although motive
is considered under Pico, a court might find that a school board's decision to re-
move a book is justified if the book is found to be educationally unsuitable, thus
permitting "politically astute school boards [to] establish procedures and a process
that can manipulate a facially rational process to camouflage the real motivations
behind their actions." Wexton, supra note 36, at 591 (asserting that Pico does not
provide adequate guidance for lower courts and risks enabling unjustified remov-
als); see also Pico, 457 U.S. at 890 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that justifying
removal decision on basis of "educational suitability" is insufficient standard). But
see Huston, supra note 31, at 241 (asserting that Pico standard is sufficient to apply
in cases concerning challenged book removals).
194. See Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d at 1244 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (stressing need
to fully assess motivation behind book removal decision).
195. See Gamsky, supra note 35, at 750 (advocating need for greater scrutiny
when shown that unconstitutional factors influenced removal decision); see also
Douglas Laycock, High-Value Speech and the Basic Educational Mission of a Public
School: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 12 LEwis & CLAu L. REv. 111, 116 (2008) (argu-
ing that it is unacceptable to permit schools to justify viewpoint discrimination on
grounds that discrimination is related to educational concerns); cf Munic, supra
note 4, at 245-46 (arguing for more stringent standard than Pico).
196. See Achtman, supra note 34, at 997 (arguing that Miami-Dade sets danger-
ous precedent for students' rights).
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public school libraries solely to prevent others from accessing certain
ideas.1 9 7 Impermissibly constraining library collections limits the range of
information available to students and inhibits independent learning op-
portunities.1 9 8 Moreover, ideologically driven restrictions on library
materials produce collections that offer only a particularized range of in-
formation based on school boards' private agendas.' 9 9 In effect, limited
book selections undermine the value of public school libraries by trans-
forming students into "closed-circuit recipients of only that which the
State chooses to communicate."20 0 This restriction obstructs students' de-
velopment of their own ideas as well-informed individuals and impedes
students' knowledge. 20 1
In recent years, thousands of book challenges occurred in the United
States, a great portion of which targeted books in public school librar-
ies. 202 Because most challenges are not publicized and proceed uncon-
tested, officials maintain significant control over school library
collections.203 As such, the legal standards that guide school boards are of
paramount importance. 204 Entrusted with the responsibility to protect
constitutional guarantees, it is crucial that school boards legitimately exer-
cise their discretion. 20 5 Enabling an improperly motivated school board
to construct a pretextual justification for a book removal sanctions an in-
197. See id. (warning of Miami-Dade's potentially harmful implications).
198. See Huston, supra note 31, at 242 (discussing detrimental effects of cen-
sorship in acquisition of library books).
199. See Heins, supra note 3, at 167 (recognizing that ideologically driven re-
strictions upon school library materials impede students' education).
200. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969)
(declaring that students are entitled to freedom of expression absent constitution-
ally valid reason to limit or regulate views). But see Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 473-74 (1982) (Rehnquist,J., dissenting) ("[I]t is 'permissible and appropri-
ate for local [school] boards to make educational decisions based upon their per-
sonal social, political and moral views."' (quoting Zykan v. Warsaw Cmty. Sch.
Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1305 (7th Cir. 1980))).
201. See SAUNDERS, supra note 9, at 252 (arguing that school "does [students]
and the rest of society an injustice when it suppresses . .. the debate" on variety of
issues); Munic, supra note 4, at 243 ("Students need access to a wide variety of
books . . . to assure exposure to a vigorous presentation of various viewpoints.").
202. See Number of Challenges by Year, Reason, Initiator & Institution (1990-2009),
AM. LIBRARY Ass'N, http://www.ala.org/ala/issuesadvocacy/banned/frequently
challenged/challengesbytype/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 7, 2011) (providing sta-
tistics on challenged books). During 1990-2009, there were 10,676 book chal-
lenges in the United States, of which 3,655 pertained to public school library
books. See id. (categorizing recent book challenges by institution).
203. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 863 (plurality opinion) (describing influential role of
school boards); DOYLE, supra note 74, at 2 (providing that most "challenges to
library materials receive no media attention and remain unreported").
204. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 864 (explaining importance of careful exercises of
discretion by school boards to avoid violating students' rights).
205. See id. (emphasizing need for school boards to act lawfully).
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fringement of students' First Amendment rights.2 0 6 Such conduct must
not be condoned, for unwarranted suppression of access to ideas in the
public school library impedes students' independent intellectual growth,
devalues the public education system, and deters society's future
development. 20 7
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